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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

YELLOWCAKE, INC., a California
corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYPHY MUSIC, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 1:20-cv-00988-JLT-BAM

Judge: Hon. Jennifer L. Thurston

Date: Sept. 15, 2023

Courtroom: Courtroom 4, 7th floor

**OPPOSITION TO HYPHY MUSIC, INC.'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

1 HYPHY MUSIC, INC.,)
2)
3 Counterclaimant,)
4)
5 v.)
6)
7 YELLOWCAKE, INC., A)
8 CALIFORNIA CORPORATION;)
9 COLONIZE MEDIA, INC.; JOSE)
10 DAVID HERNANDEZ; and JESUS)
11 CHAVEZ SR,)
12)
13)
14)
15 Counterdefendants.)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)
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24)
25)
26)
27)
28)

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a straightforward case of copyright infringement concerning six copyrighted “Albums” (defined below) of sound recordings owned by Plaintiff-Counterdefendant Yellowcake, Inc. (“Yellowcake”), that were recorded by the artist and Counterdefendant Jesus Chavez, Sr. (“Chavez”), founder, principal performer, and manager of the band known as Los Originales De San Juan (the “Band”). Defendant-Counterclaimant Hyphy Music, Inc. (“Hyphy”), a record label and music distributor, knowingly continued to exploit these Albums after they were lawfully sold by Chavez to Yellowcake after Chavez had terminated a prior oral distribution agreement with Hyphy. Despite Yellowcake’s demands, Hyphy refused to stop exploiting the Albums necessitating the filing of this action.

Hyphy’s motion seeks summary judgment (i) dismissing Yellowcake’s Complaint, which alleges two causes of action against Hyphy for its infringement of the copyright Albums; (ii) on Hyphy’s Second Claim for Relief that alleges Yellowcake and Colonize infringed on Hyphy’s copyright in album cover art related to the Albums; and (iii) on Hyphy’s Sixth Claim for Relief for unfair competition against Yellowcake, Colonize and David Hernandez (“Hernandez”), the principal of Colonize. *See* Notice of Motion, [Dkt. 78](#) at Pgs. ii-iii.

The prong of Hyphy’s motion to dismiss Yellowcake’s causes of action for infringement, which is entirely grounded in Hyphy’s fictitious claim that it is either a co-owner or nonexclusive licensee of the copyrights in the Albums’ sound recordings, should be denied because Hyphy fall far short of meeting its burden. Additionally, this prong of the motion must be denied regarding “Naci Con Suerte de Rey Con Mariachi,” one of the six Albums that are the subjects of Yellowcake’s Complaint, for the simple

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1 fact that Hyphy excluded that Album from the scope of its motion.¹

2 The second prong of Hyphy’s motion, for summary judgment on its own claim
3 of infringement of album cover artwork, should be denied because Hyphy fails to show
4 that Yellowcake or Colonize committed the alleged acts of infringement in the first
5 place. Indeed, Hyphy’s “evidence” on this prong is patently defective, constituting,
6 *inter alia*, speculation or inadmissible hearsay.

7 Finally, the third prong of Hyphy’s motion, for summary judgment on its state
8 law unfair competition claim, must be denied because this Court already dismissed it,
9 in granting Yellowcake’s prior motion to dismiss. *See* Order dated July 20, 2021 (the
10 “MTD Order”), [Dkt. 42](#) at Pg. 36, Lns. 1-7. In fact, as reflected in the MTD Order, the
11 Court previously dismissed *all* of Hyphy’s counterclaims against Yellowcake, Colonize
12 and/or Hernandez except for the Second Claim for Relief related to the artwork, which
13 was not at issue in that motion.

14 Based on the foregoing, and as further detailed below, Hyphy’s motion must be
15 denied in its entirety and, moreover, the summary judgment motion filed by Yellowcake
16 on July 14, 2023 ([Dkt. 82](#)), for summary judgment on its two causes of action and
17 dismissing Hyphy’s Second Claim for Relief lone surviving counterclaim, should be
18 granted in its entirety.

19 ///

20 ///

21 ///

22
23 ¹ Hyphy does not include *Naci Con Suerte de Rey Con Mariachi* within Hyphy’s definition of the “Albums” at
24 issue in its motion. *See* Hyphy’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of same (“MPA”), [Dkt. 78](#)
25 at Pg. 3, Lns. 4-7; Hyphy’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Hyphy SUF”), [Dkt. 78-20](#) at statement
26 nos. 5, 26, 53, 94, 130, 160). Furthermore, Hyphy does not proffer any specific arguments, facts or evidence
27 regarding that Album and, in fact, the motion does not refer to that Album at all. Consequently, Hyphy failed
28 to satisfy its initial legal burden to show it is entitled to summary judgment. Its decision not to do so was
obviously purposeful. *See* MPA, [Dkt. 78](#) at Pg. 3 Lns. 1-10) (immediately after defining the five Albums that
are the subject of its motion, Hyphy states “[o]ne of the other two albums identified in Yellowcake’s Complaint
... has no connection to this dispute ...”); Hyphy SUF, [Dkt. 78-20](#) at statement nos. 6, 27, 54, 95, 131, 161
(same).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Copyrighted Albums at Issue

Chavez is a legendary Mexican musical artist and the founder of the Band. *See* Declaration of Jesus Chavez, Sr. in Support of Plaintiff and Counterdefendants’ Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Counterclaims and Supplemental Brief (“Chavez Decl.”), [Dkt. 46-2](#), ¶ 3-4. Chavez was always the bandleader, principal performer, and principal songwriter of the Band. This has been acknowledged by Hyphy. *See* Hyphy’s Counterclaim (the “Counterclaim”), [Dkt. 7](#) at ¶ 15; FAC, [Dkt. 15](#) at ¶ 15; Hyphy’s Opposition to Plaintiff-Counterdefendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Defendant-Counterclaimant’s Counterclaims Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (the “Opp. to MTD”), [Dkt. 27](#), Pg. 1, Ln. 27 - Pg. 2, Ln. 1. Chavez had always owned all intellectual property produced by the Band including all copyrights in its sound recordings and trademarks until he later sold them to Yellowcake. Chavez Decl., [Dkt. 46-2](#) at ¶¶ 8-21.

Between 2013 and 2015, Chavez, recording under the name Los Originales de San Juan, recorded six albums titled: (i) Los Originales de San Juan- “El Campesino”; (ii) Los Originales de San Juan-“Corridos de Poca M”; (iii) Los Originales de San Juan-“En Vivo Desde La Cantina de Mi Barrio”; (iv) Los Originales de San Juan-“Nuestra Historia En Vivo”; (v) Los Originales de San Juan- “Amigos y Contrarios”; and (vi) Los Originales de San Juan-“Naci Con Suerte de Rey Con Mariachi” (collectively, the “Albums”). Chavez Decl. [Dkt. 46-2](#) at ¶ 7. Hector Omar Rosales (“Rosales”) was the audio engineer for three (3) of the Albums recorded in his studio. *See* Declaration of Hector O. Rosales in Support of Plaintiff and Counterdefendants’ Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaims and In Support of Supplemental Brief (“Rosales Decl.”) [Dkt. 46-1](#), ¶ 5; Chavez Decl. [Dkt. 46-2](#), ¶ 11. The Albums’ sound recordings are listed by track on Exhibit “A” to the Complaint. *See* [Dkt. 1](#). Chavez was the sole producer of the Albums and no employee or anyone else affiliated with Hyphy produced or co-authored any songs on the Albums, or provided any original creative input into the

1 recording of the Albums. Chavez Decl., [Dkt. 46-2](#), ¶ 8; Rosales Decl. [Dkt. 46-1](#) at ¶¶ 7-
2 10.

3 At no time during their recording or subsequent existence were there any other
4 co-owners with Chavez of the copyrighted sound recordings in the Albums. Chavez
5 Decl., [Dkt. 46-2](#) at ¶¶ 8-21.

6 **The Oral Distribution Agreement between Chavez and Hyphy**

7 In or around September 2013, Chavez and Hyphy entered into an oral distribution
8 agreement for the Albums recorded by Chavez under the name Los Originales de San
9 Juan. Chavez Decl., [Dkt. 46-2](#) at ¶ 6; Counterclaims, [Dkt. 7](#) at ¶ 16; FAC, [Dkt. 15](#) at
10 ¶ 16; Opp. to MTD, [Dkt. 27](#), Pg. 2 Lns. 1-5. Although Hyphy misrepresents the nature
11 of that oral agreement as one where Hyphy “commissioned” sound recordings, up until
12 very recently, Hyphy has consistently pled and averred in sworn submissions to the
13 Court that Hyphy “commissioned” Chavez, and *Chavez alone*, to record the Albums.
14 See Counterclaim, [Dkt. 7](#) at ¶ 16; FAC, [Dkt. 15](#) at ¶ 16; Opp. to MTD, [Dkt. 27](#) at Pg. 2,
15 Lns. 1-5; Hyphy’s Reply to Counterdefendants’ Challenge to The Validity of Certain
16 Copyright Registrations [Dkt. 45](#), Pg. 1 at Lns. 16-18; Declaration of Jose Martinez in
17 Support of Reply to Counterdefendants’ Challenge to the Validity of Certain Copyright
18 Registrations (the “2021 Martinez Decl.”), [Dkt. 45-1](#) at Pg. 1, Lns. 8-16. According to
19 Hyphy’s sole owner and chief executive officer, Jose Martinez (“Martinez”), Hyphy
20 used written agreements with artists about 80 percent of the time, but did not do so with
21 Chavez. See Martinez’s deposition transcript (“Martinez Trans.”) at Pg. 23, Ln. 18 -
22 Pg. 24, Ln. 18 annexed as **Exhibit “A”** to the Declaration of Seth L. Berman (“Berman
23 Decl.”). In connection with his agreement with Hyphy, Chavez had no intent to transfer
24 any ownership interest in the Albums to Hyphy, and there is no evidence in the record
25 to suggest that he did. Chavez Decl. [Dkt. 46-2](#) at ¶ 14.

26 **Yellowcake’s Ownership of the Albums**

27 Yellowcake is primarily engaged in the business of owning, managing, and
28 exploiting various intellectual property rights. See Declaration of Kevin Berger

1 (“Berger Decl.”), [Dkt. 82-14](#) at ¶ 2. Colonize is a company engaged in the business of
 2 digital music distribution and distributes the Albums on behalf of Yellowcake. *See*
 3 Berger Decl., [Dkt. 82-14](#) at ¶ 13. Hernandez is a principal of Colonize. *See* Declaration
 4 of Jose David Hernandez (“Hernandez Decl.”), [Dkt. 82-16](#) at ¶ 1.

5 On or about March 21, 2019, Yellowcake and Chavez entered into an Asset
 6 Purchase and Assignment Agreement (“APA Agreement”), whereby Yellowcake
 7 purchased Chavez’s entire ownership of the rights, title and interests in all sound
 8 recordings of Los Originales De San Juan, including the Albums. *See* Berger Decl., [Dkt.](#)
 9 [82-14](#) ¶ 9; APA Agreement, [Dkt. 82-3](#). In the agreement, Chavez represented that he
 10 owned all rights transferred to Yellowcake therein. APA Agreement, [Dkt. 82-3](#) at
 11 ¶ 13(e).

12 Prior to entering into the APA Agreement, Yellowcake searched the United
 13 States Copyright Office (“USCO”) to determine if any potential competing copyright
 14 registrations filed for the Albums existed. It found none because there were none. *See*
 15 Berger Decl., [Dkt. 82-14](#) at ¶¶ 7-8. Following its execution of the APA Agreement,
 16 Yellowcake complied with all requirements set forth by the Copyright Act, [17 U.S.C.](#)
 17 [§ 101, et seq.](#), by registering copyrights for each sound recording acquired by the APA
 18 Agreement, and also recorded the APA Agreement with the USCO. *See* Berger Decl.,
 19 [Dkt. 82-14](#) at ¶¶ 11-12. The USCO then issued Yellowcake a Certificate of Registration
 20 for each copyrighted Album. Complaint, [Dkt. 1](#) at ¶ 2.

21 **Hyphy’s Unauthorized Exploitation of the Copyrighted Albums**

22 Sometime after receiving the Certificates of Registration, Yellowcake learned
 23 that Hyphy had been distributing copies of sound recordings from the Albums and
 24 created and/or uploaded videos containing unauthorized derivative works of the sound
 25 recordings to www.YouTube.com. *See* Complaint, [Dkt. 1](#) at ¶¶ 15-16; Berger Decl.,
 26 [Dkt. 82-14](#) at ¶ 18.

27 Shortly thereafter, in or about June 2020, Yellowcake filed “Takedown Notices”
 28 pursuant to [17 U.S.C. § 512 et seq.](#), through YouTube claiming ownership of the songs

1 and notified Hyphy’s distributor, The Orchard, that Hyphy was infringing Yellowcake’s
2 copyrighted Albums. *See* said correspondence, [Dkt. 82-4](#).

3 Hyphy disregarded these notices and continued to exploit the Albums, including
4 but not limited to selling and streaming them on multiple digital service provider
5 platforms such as Spotify, Apple Music, and Amazon Music, even after Yellowcake
6 filed this lawsuit. *See* Hyphy’s royalty reports extending to 2022 subpoenaed from The
7 Orchard, [Dkt. 82-5](#). As such, Yellowcake was required under 17 U.S.C. § 512 *et seq.*
8 and YouTube’s protocols to file this action to protect its rights and to resolve any
9 conflicts with the digital service provider platforms.

10 **III. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

11 Yellowcake commenced this action for copyright infringement on July 16, 2020
12 (Complaint, [Dkt. 1](#)). Defendant, Hyphy Music, filed its answer ([Dkt. 8](#))² and its
13 Counterclaim ([Dkt. 7](#)) against Yellowcake, Colonize and Hernandez on August 19,
14 2020. On August 28, 2020, Hyphy, filed its FAC ([Dkt. 15](#)).

15 On October 2, 2020, Yellowcake, Colonize, and Hernandez moved to dismiss
16 Hyphy’s Claims for Relief numbered 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the FAC. ([Dkt. 23](#)), Hyphy
17 opposed such motion on October 16, 2020 ([Dkt. 27](#)). Yellowcake, Colonize, and
18 Hernandez replied to such opposition on October 27, 2020 ([Dkt. 28](#)), and also filed with
19 the Court a Request for Judicial Notice in support of their motion ([Dkt. 29](#)).

20 In the MTD Order, dated July 20, 2021 ([Dkt. 42](#)), the Court (i) dismissed all of
21 the Claims for Relief subject to the motion with leave to amend several of them; and
22 (ii) ordered the parties to submit additional briefing to address inconsistencies between
23 Hyphy’s FAC and copyright registrations Hyphy had filed with the United States
24 Register of Copyrights. Hyphy did not file a second amended counterclaim, leaving
25 only Hyphy’s Second Claim for Relief against Yellowcake and Colonize for copyright
26 infringement of certain copyrighted album artwork. Also, as a result of the motion to
27

28 ² Hyphy apparently filed an answer at [Dkt. 6](#) but mislabeled it “Counterclaim,” and then filed the same document at [Dkt. 8](#) and labeled it “Answer.”

1 dismiss, there are no remaining counterclaims against Hernandez. On August 3, 2021,
 2 Hyphy filed the supplemental briefing ordered by the Court ([Dkt. 45](#)), and on August
 3 10, 2021, Yellowcake, Colonize, and Hernandez filed their response thereto ([Dkt. 46](#)).

4 On August 17, 2021, Yellowcake, Colonize, and Hernandez filed their Answer
 5 to Hyphy's FAC ([Dkt. 47](#)).

6 Hyphy filed an *ex parte* application seeking to supplement its initial disclosure
 7 and to further respond to document production on October 12, 2022 ([Dkt. 55](#)). The
 8 Court issued an order dated October 20, 2022, granting Hyphy's *ex parte* application
 9 ([Dkt. 59](#)).

10 On May 19, 2023, Hyphy filed its motion for summary judgment ([Dkt. 78](#)) and
 11 on July 14, 2023, Yellowcake and Colonize filed their motion for summary judgment.

12 **IV. DISCOVERY**

13 Yellowcake served its first set of interrogatories on November 24, 2021, and
 14 Hyphy served its response to same on March 31, 2022 ([Dkt. 82-6](#)). Yellowcake served
 15 two sets of requests for production, on November 24, 2021, and October 27, 2022,
 16 respectively. Hyphy served its responses to same on January 18, 2022 ([Dkt. 82-7](#)), and
 17 March 31, 2022 ([Dkt. 82-8](#)), respectively, and served supplemental responses to same
 18 on October 10, 2022 ([Dkt. 82-9](#)), and November 28, 2022 ([Dkt. 82-10](#)), respectively.
 19 On February 4, 2022, Yellowcake served a subpoena to produce documents on The
 20 Orchard, who produced documents in response to same on April 13, 2022, May 4 and
 21 6, 2022, and May 11, 2022 ([Dkt. 82-5](#)).

22 **APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD**

23 The "purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the
 24 proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." *Matsuhita Elec. Indus.*
 25 *Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
 26 (1986) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine
 27 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
 28 *Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)*.

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Hyphy, as the party seeking summary judgment, bore the “initial responsibility” of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. *Celotex Corp v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). An issue of fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party, while a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); *Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc.*, 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). Where, as here, the moving party seeks summary judgment on a claim or defense on which the opposing party bears the burden of persuasion at trial “the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” *Jones v. Williams*, 791 F.3d 1023, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2015). A moving party demonstrates summary judgment is appropriate by “informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting *Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)*). Where the moving party’s version of events differs from the non-moving party’s version, a “courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.” *Scott v. Harris*, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quotation and alteration omitted).

ARGUMENT

V. DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENT THAT YELLOWCAKE LACKS STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION SHOULD BE REJECTED

In Point V.A. of Hyphy’s MPA, Hyphy argues that Yellowcake lacks standing to sue Hyphy, or anyone else, for copyright infringement of the Albums because Yellowcake is merely a non-exclusive licensee of Chavez’s rights in the Albums, and non-exclusive licensees lack standing to sue for infringement. See MPA, Dkt. 78 at Pg.

7, Ln. 17 – Pg. 10, Ln. 5. Specifically, Hyphy reasons that: (i) because Alfonso Vargas (“Vargas”), a former drummer in the Band, and Domingo Torres Flores (“Torres”), a former accordion player in the Band, allegedly co-authored the Albums with Chavez, (ii) and Yellowcake obtained an assignment of only Chavez’s rights in the Albums via the APA Agreement, (iii) then Yellowcake did not acquire exclusive rights in the Albums, (iv) and therefore Yellowcake has no standing to sue anyone for copyright infringement.

It first must be noted that Hyphy’s reasoning and conclusion presumes Vargas and Torres possessed copyright rights in the Albums on the alleged basis that they co-authored the Albums. This is a completely fictitious presumption which is disproven in detail below. Leaving that issue aside for the moment, the argument Hyphy is really trying to make in Point V.A. of its MPA is that Yellowcake, as an assignee of one co-author’s copyright, lacks standing to sue others for infringing that copyright.

Hyphy is patently incorrect on the facts and law. Chavez did not merely assign or license his rights in the Albums to Yellowcake. Instead, pursuant to the APA Agreement, Chavez sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed, and delivered to Yellowcake the “entirety of ownership” of Chavez’s rights, title, and interest in the Albums, and a “legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright” is “entitled to sue for copyright infringement.” *Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.*, 402 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir 2005) (A) (citation omitted). Hyphy’s blunder in believing Yellowcake to be an assignee of Chavez’s copyright rights, as opposed to being their owner, is also coupled by Hyphy’s misreading of *Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp.* 517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). *Sybersound Records* addresses whether a co-owner of a copyright interest can unilaterally grant an exclusive license to that interest to a third party. That is not the factual scenario present here, *i.e.*, the copyright owner (Chavez) sold his entire interest in the copyright to another (Yellowcake). Furthermore, *Sybersound Records* does not hold that a co-owner requires the permission of the other co-owners to sue a third party for copyright infringement. As the Ninth Circuit stated a few years after

1 deciding *Sybersound Records*: “[T]he [*Sybersound*] Court’s emphasis on the word
 2 ‘exclusive’ in the [statutory] provisions cannot mean that only sole owners possess
 3 ‘exclusive’ rights, as such a rule would run directly contrary to another well-settled
 4 principle of copyright law: the right of one joint-owner to sue third-party infringers
 5 without joining any of his fellow co-owners, a right *Sybersound* itself expressly
 6 recognizes.” *Corbello v. DeVito*, 777 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015).

7 Based on the foregoing, Hyphy’s request for summary judgment on
 8 Yellowcake’s copyright infringement claims for lack of standing must be denied.

9 **VI. HYPHY IS NOT A CO-OWNER OR CO-AUTHOR OF THE ALBUMS,**
 10 **NOR DOES IT HAVE A LICENSE TO EXPLOIT THEM**

11 **A. Hyphy Is not Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Ground that Hyphy**
 12 **Co-Owns the Albums**

13 Hyphy asserts it co-owns the Albums “for two indisputable reasons”: (1) it is a
 14 co-creator of the Albums (Hyphy Motion, [Dkt. 78](#) at Pg. 10, Ln. 14 – Pg. 11, Ln. 19)
 15 and/or (2) Torres and Vargas co-created the Albums and then assigned their rights in
 16 the Albums to Hyphy ([id.](#) at Pg. 11, Ln. 20 – Pg. 11, Ln. 27).

17 **1. Hyphy Fails to Meet its Burden to Demonstrate that it is a**
 18 **Co-Author of the Albums**

19 Hyphy asserts it “contributed more than a modicum of creativity to the creation
 20 of the Albums.” [Id.](#) at Pg. 10, Ln. 14. Hyphy claims it provided the creative direction
 21 for the Albums, selected the songs to be included in each, paid for the recording costs
 22 (and cost of the venue for the live recordings) costs of recording two of the Albums,
 23 and hired the sound engineer (and videographer for the live recordings) who recorded
 24 all of the Albums.” [Id.](#) at Pg. 10, Ln. 27 – Pg. 11, Ln. 2.

25 Summary judgment on this claim must be denied for two reasons. First, Chavez
 26 and Rosales, who possess personal knowledge of the Albums’ recording, dispute these
 27 facts. Second, and more critical, is that even if such claims were true, which they are not,
 28 Hyphy simply describes general record label activities. Such activities are not sufficient

1 works of original authorship to deem Hyphy a co-owner with Chavez as a matter of law.

2 Under the Copyright Act, a “joint work” is a work prepared by two or more authors
3 with the *intention* that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
4 parts of a unitary whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101. An “author” is “the party who actually creates
5 the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression
6 entitled to copyright protection.” *Cnty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730,
7 737 (1989).

8 *Aalmuhammed v. Lee*, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) sets forth three factors for
9 determining whether a work is jointly authored. “First, an author superintend[s] the work
10 by exercising control.” *Id.* at 1234 (quoting *Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony*,
11 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884)). “Second, putative coauthors make objective manifestations of
12 a shared intent to be coauthors” *Id.* “[T]hird, the audience appeal of the work turns
13 on both contributions and ‘the share of each in its success cannot be appraised.’” *Id.*
14 (quoting *Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.*, 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d
15 Cir.), modified by 140 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944)).

16 The creativity one must contribute to be an author must be more than merely de
17 minimis. *Stillwater Ltd. v. Basilotta*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137746. Even if there is an
18 agreement to collaborate, if there is only a non-copyrightable contribution made by the
19 party in question that contribution will not be enough, in the Ninth Circuit, to meet the
20 requirements for joint authorship. *Ashton-Tate v. Ross*, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990);
21 *Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc.*, 531 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008).

22 In *Stillwater Ltd.*, three parties attempted to argue joint authorship of the songs in
23 question, Radialchoice Ltd. (a recording company formed by Lait), Stillwater (the
24 recording company Lait transferred ownership of the disputed sound recordings and the
25 “Mix and Spanish Recordings” to), and Greg Mathieson (music producer of the songs).
26 *Stillwater Ltd.*, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137746 (C.D. Cal. 2020). The court determined
27 it was not enough of a contribution for Radialchoice, as the record label, to be considered
28 a co-author just because it financed, approved, marketed, and distributed the work. *Id.*

1 The court also found that Lait’s direction, vision, or idea for the songs did not amount to
 2 a copyrightable contribution because they were not “fixed” in a “tangible medium of
 3 expression” and the mere supply of direction or ideas was not enough. *Stillwater Ltd.*,
 4 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137466 (C.D. Cal. 2020); *S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday Inc.*, 886 F.2d
 5 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989). Finally, the court concluded Mathieson’s contributions failed
 6 to meet the *Aalmuhammed* criteria.

7 Again, “[T]o be an author, one must supply more than mere direction or ideas; one
 8 must ‘translate an idea into a fixable tangible expression entitled to copyright
 9 protection.’” *S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.*, 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989); *Ashton-*
 10 *Tate*, 916 F.2d at 521. “[A] person who merely describes to an author what the
 11 commissioned work should do or look like is not a joint author for the purposes of the
 12 Copyright Act.” See *S.O.S., Inc.*, 886 F.2d at 1087. In *S.O.S., Inc.*, the Ninth Circuit
 13 found that the defendant, Payday, Inc., “did nothing more than describe the sort of
 14 programs Payday wanted S.O.S. to write.” See *id.* Even if there is an agreement to
 15 collaborate, if there is only a noncopyrightable contribution made by the party in
 16 question that contribution will not be enough, in the Ninth Circuit, to meet the
 17 requirements for joint authorship. *Ashton-Tate v. Ross*, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990);
 18 *Richlin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Inc.*, 531 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008).

19 Clearly, Hyphy was not a co-author of the Albums. Chavez and Rosales, the audio
 20 engineer, declared that Chavez had complete control over the production and recording
 21 of the Albums. See Chavez Decl. [Dkt. 46-2](#) and Rosales Decl. [Dkt. 46-1](#). Furthermore,
 22 Hyphy admits in the FAC that *Chavez alone* was the original author of the albums and
 23 that Hyphy only offered nominal artistic direction typical of a record label or distributor
 24 and not that anyone affiliated with Hyphy made any copyrightable contribution. FAC,
 25 [Dkt. 15](#) at ¶¶ 16-17.

26 Further Hyphy fails to meet its burden to demonstrate “objective manifestations
 27 of a shared intent” among Chavez and Hyphy or Martinez to be co-authors. Instead,
 28 Hyphy merely proffers Martinez’s self-serving descriptions of his own actions – which

1 themselves appear to be the mundane activities engaged in by any record label.

2 Additionally, since Hyphy provided no performance or other creative
3 contributions to the Albums, Hyphy has failed to meet its burden to establish that it
4 provided a copyrightable contribution to the Albums that contributed to their success.
5 As such, there can be no audience appeal associated with Hyphy.

6 Based on the foregoing, Hyphy had failed to establish as a matter of law that it is
7 a joint author of the Albums under the *Aalmuhammed* criteria and, therefore, this prong
8 of Hyphy’s Motion must be denied.

9 **2. Hyphy Fails to Meet its Burden to Demonstrate that It Is Otherwise**
10 **a Co-Owner of the Albums**

11 Hyphy argues that “even if Hyphy did not contribute enough creatively to the
12 creation of some or all of the Albums, Hyphy became a co-owner when it acquired all of
13 Torres’s and Vargas’s respective interests in their creative contributions thereto.” *See*
14 Hyphy Motion, [Dkt. 78](#) at Pg. 11, Lns. 20-22.

15 **a. Hyphy’s Binding Judicial Admissions Preclude it from**
16 **Obtaining Summary Judgment on this Basis**

17 Knowing that it had no legitimate excuse for its actions, Hyphy, only after getting
18 sued by Yellowcake, manufactured the theories that Hyphy owned the Albums because
19 it “commissioned” Chavez to record them via an oral agreement and/or because Hyphy
20 co-authored the Albums. Hyphy pled the “facts” supporting these theories in its
21 Counterclaim and FAC. Years later, after the Court had dismissed most of Hyphy’s
22 counterclaims, Hyphy realized that its theory of ownership was defective and began
23 claiming the alleged oral agreement with Chavez was not really an agreement with him
24 at all! All this time, Hyphy now claims, the oral agreement was really with Chavez,
25 Torres and Vargas, and all this time they were also co-authors of the Albums. Several
26 months after Hyphy asserted these claims, in October 2022, only one month before
27 dispositive motions were due, Hyphy altered its position yet again, this time conjuring-
28 up unnotarized assignments, which were purportedly executed by Vargas and Torres and

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1 counter-signed by Martinez seven months before-hand on March 22, 2022 (the “Alleged
 2 Assignments”). See [Dkt. 55-4](#) (copies of same). All of these brand-new positions are
 3 irreconcilable with the facts pled by Hyphy in the FAC in support of its claim to an
 4 ownership interest in the Albums. Those facts pled are binding judicial admissions.

5 “[A]dmissions in the pleadings are generally binding on the parties and the Court.
 6 *Am. Tit. Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp.*, 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
 7 “Judicial admissions are formal admissions in the pleadings which have the effect of
 8 withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the
 9 fact.” *Id.* (citation omitted). “*Factual assertions in pleadings and pretrial orders,*
 10 *unless amended, are considered judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party*
 11 *who made them.*” *Id.* (emphasis supplied).

12 Hyphy’s FAC alleges the purported facts and circumstances of Hyphy’s
 13 acquisition of rights to the Albums’ sound recordings. In that context, Hyphy
 14 unambiguously claimed that its alleged rights were derived from an oral agreement with
 15 Chavez, and Chavez alone: “Hyphy entered into an oral exclusive recording agreements
 16 [sic] with Jesus Chavez . . . whereby [Hyphy] commissioned Chavez . . . to exclusively
 17 provide services as a recording artist in the making of [the recordings in the Albums].”
 18 FAC, [Dkt. 15](#) at ¶ 16; *see also* Counterclaim, [Dkt. 7](#) at ¶ 16 (same). Hyphy then outlined
 19 the alleged terms of the agreement it made with Chavez:

20 “Pursuant to the Agreement, [Hyphy] agreed to: . . . pay Chavez a fixed
 21 amount per Los Originales Album”; “[i]n turn, Chavez agreed to [, *inter*
 22 *alia*,] follow Hyphy’s artistic direction [and] perform and record [various]
 23 sound and audiovisual recordings”; and “[i]n consideration for the services
 24 provided and payment thereto, Chavez agreed that [Hyphy] would be the
 25 *owner of all title, right, and interest in [the Albums].*”

26 *Id.*; *see also* Counterclaim at ¶ 16 (same).

27 Several paragraphs later, in casting aspersions on the legality of the APA
 28 Agreement, Hyphy again confirmed that Chavez was the direct source of Hyphy’s
 purported rights in the sound recordings:

1 “[Hyphy] is informed and believes that at that time, [Chavez] advised
 2 [Hernandez] that he had entered into a contract with [Hyphy] and that
 3 [Hyphy] was the owner of the Los Originales Albums. [Hernandez]
 4 intentionally and willfully misled [Chavez] when he wrongfully and
 5 mistakenly told him that [Hyphy] had no rights to the Los Originales
 6 Albums, was free to sell the subject works to Hernandez’s companies,
 Yellowcake and Colonize, and offered Chavez a significant sum of money
 to purportedly purchase the rights in the Los Originales Albums.”

7 [Dkt. 15](#) at ¶¶ 21-22; *see also* Counterclaim [Dkt. 7](#) at ¶ 21-22 (same).

8 It is also critical that, in its decision granting Yellowcake’s prior motion to
 9 dismiss, the Court understood that the gravamen of Hyphy’s claims was an alleged oral
 10 agreement between Hyphy and Chavez. *See, e.g.*, MTD Order, [Dkt. 42](#) at Pg. 8, Lns.
 11 25-26 (“[T]he express allegations in the FAC identify the only agreement between
 12 Hyphy and Chavez as an oral one.”); *id.* at Pg. 9, Lns. 3-7 (Chavez’s belief that he had
 13 not transferred his ownership interest to Hyphy “is contrary to *Hyphy’s alleged position*
 14 *that it held all exclusive rights by virtue of its oral agreement with Chavez.*”); *id.* at Pg.
 15 33, Lns. 24-25 (“[T]he FAC attempts to claim ownership through either an oral transfer
 16 agreement with Chavez or as a co-author/joint owner.”).

17 As the foregoing constitute binding judicial admissions by Hyphy that it acquired
 18 its rights in the Albums via its oral agreement with Chavez (just as the Court previously
 19 understood Hyphy to be alleging), Hyphy’s motion must be denied to the extent it seeks
 20 summary judgment under the theory that Vargas or Torres were co-owners of the sound
 21 recordings and/or transferred such purported interest to Hyphy. *See Estate of McNeil by*
 22 *and through Berkes v. FreestyleMX.com, Inc.*, 13-CV-2703, 2015 WL 13567073, at *5
 23 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2015); *Martini E Ricci Iamino S.P.A.-Consortile Societa Agricola v.*
 24 *Trinity Fruit Sales Co., Inc.*, 30 F. Supp. 3d 954, 971 (E.D. Cal. 2014).

25 **b. Hyphy Fails to Demonstrate Torres’ and Vargas Co-Authored**
 26 **the Albums in the First Instance**

27 First, separate and apart from the judicial admission doctrine, the fact that Hyphy’s
 28 current position inexplicably contradicts its prior position in and of itself creates a genuine

1 issue of fact as to whether Torres and Vargas co-authored the Albums (notably, Hyphy's
 2 position as pled in the FAC was reiterated by Martinez in the 2021 Martinez Decl. filed
 3 with the Court (*see* [Dkt. 45-1](#))). Therefore, summary judgment must be denied for that
 4 reason as well. *See Lawshe v. Amerus Life Ins. Co.*, 19 Fed. Appx. 692, 694 (9th Cir.
 5 2001).

6 Second, after years of allegedly co-creating the Albums, in 2020, Hyphy filed its
 7 baseless copyright registrations for the Albums. Those registrations state that Hyphy
 8 owns the Albums under a work-for-hire agreement with Chavez, and do not state
 9 anywhere that Vargas or Torres co-authored the Albums (the law requires copyright
 10 registrant to identify its co-authors). *See* Counterclaim [Dkt. 7](#). Therefore, the
 11 registrations contradict Hyphy's newly fabricated theories and Alleged Assignments.
 12 *Studio S Imports, LLC v. Deutsch Imports, LLC*, 19-CV-10666, 2021 WL 3598571, at
 13 *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 21, 2021).

14 Third, the terms, circumstances, and timing of the disclosure of the Alleged
 15 Assignments proves that they are fraudulent and were contrived by Hyphy to fend off
 16 Yellowcake's obvious right to summary judgment on its claims for copyright
 17 infringement. Specifically, *the unnotarized Alleged Assignments were allegedly signed*
 18 *on March 22, 2022, but they were not disclosed by Hyphy until October 10, 2022*, well
 19 after the July 28, 2022, cutoff for fact discovery under the Court's initial scheduling
 20 order and only thirty-six days before the November 15, 2022, cutoff for filing summary
 21 judgment motions. *See* Initial Scheduling Order, [Dkt. 50](#). Notably, when Hyphy moved
 22 to supplement its disclosures with the Alleged Assignment and other documents,
 23 Hyphy's motion did not provide an excuse for why the seemingly critical assignments
 24 were not produced seven months beforehand when they were supposedly executed. *See*
 25 *generally* Hyphy's *Ex Parte* Application for Leave to Supplement Initial Disclosures
 26 and Responses to Request for Production of Documents, [Dkt. 55](#).

27 Most telling that the Alleged Assignments are fabrications are the facts that (1)
 28 they purportedly transfer "100%" of Vargas' and Torres' "undivided right, title and

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1 interest in and to” the Albums including, for example “all audio-only and audiovisual
 2 master recordings” – in fact, rights in the master recordings are a focal point of the
 3 assignments (*see* Alleged Assignments, [Dkt. 55](#) at §§ (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)); *but* (2) four
 4 months after Martinez purportedly executed the Alleged Assignments, when he was
 5 deposed, (i) he was asked if he has any written documents that “would memorialize any
 6 agreement or understanding between Hyphy and the band that Hyphy would own any
 7 master recordings,” and responded, in part, “it was not written” (*see* Martinez Trans.,
 8 Berman Decl., **Ex. “A”** at Pg. 125, Ln. 18 – Pg. 126, Ln. 1), and (ii) *he made no mention*
 9 *of these Alleged Assignments at all*, even though Vargas and Torres testified that
 10 Martinez gave them the Alleged Assignments and they executed them in Hyphy’s
 11 office. *See* Vargas Trans, [Dkt. 82-11](#) at Pg. 55 Lns. 8-13 - Pg. 56, Lns. 8-12; Torres
 12 Trans., [Dkt. 82-12](#) at Pg. 57, Ln. 9-11, and Pg. 58, Lns. 1-19; Pg. 60, Lns. 11-16.
 13 Considering the central disputes and issues in this case, it is impossible to believe that
 14 Martinez forgot he had signed the assignments acquiring all of Torres’ and Vargas’
 15 rights in the masters or never mention the assignments in his testimony if they actually
 16 existed at that time, and impossible to believe that if they existed while discovery was
 17 open that Hyphy simply forgot to produce them.

18 Furthermore, the terms of the Alleged Assignments are inherently suspect.
 19 Vargas and Torres allegedly assigned their alleged interests in the Albums to Hyphy for
 20 only one dollar (\$1.00) each. *See* [Dkt. 55-4](#). Meanwhile, Yellowcake paid Chavez fair-
 21 market value in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (\$500,000.00) for the
 22 entire interest in the Albums. *See* Berger Decl., [Dkt. 82-14](#) at ¶ 10. It is hard to believe
 23 that Vargas and Torres would assign their alleged interest in such valuable copyrights
 24 to Hyphy for only one dollar (\$1.00) each if they truly owned such interests. Torres and
 25 Vargas also testified that they never even read the Alleged Assignment before they
 26 executed them and did not know what they were for. *See* Torres Trans., [Dkt. 82-12](#) at
 27 Pg. 60, Lns. 11-16; and Vargas Trans., [Dkt. 82-11](#) at Pg. 56, Lns. 8-12. Furthermore,
 28 the Alleged Assignments do not state what percentage of the Albums Vargas and Torres

1 allegedly own and, therefore, would be unenforceable on their face as vague.

2 Vargas also admitted to having a motive in helping Hyphy with this farce.
 3 Unfortunately, Chavez has had two strokes that left him unable to perform anymore.
 4 Vargas and Torres then attempted to tour and release new music as Los Originales De
 5 San Juan through Hyphy without Chavez, even though it was his band. In response,
 6 Chavez, as owner Los Originales De San Juan's trademark, sent a cease and desist letter
 7 to Vargas and Torres who acknowledged Chavez's ownership of the mark by complying
 8 with the cease and desist letter. *See* [Dkt. 82-13](#). Vargas also then admitted that they
 9 went to Martinez, who said that he would help them release new music for their new
 10 band if they signed the Alleged Assignments for both Hyphy and Morena Music, Inc.
 11 ("Morena") and helped Hyphy and Morena, who was also sued by Yellowcake for
 12 similar acts of copyright infringement, in their lawsuits with Yellowcake. *See* Vargas
 13 Trans., [Dkt. 82-11](#) at Pg. 56, Ln. 25 - Pg. 58, Ln. 17, Pg. 59, Lns. 8-21.³

14 Furthermore, Hyphy never produced any written co-author agreement or
 15 partnership agreement amongst Chavez, Torres, and Vargas, and never produced any
 16 objective evidence whatsoever that there was an understanding that Vargas and Torres
 17 were coauthors of the Albums with Chavez. Nor did Vargas or Torres ever file any
 18 copyright registrations for their alleged ownership of the Albums or demanded any
 19 royalties from Chavez from the sale of the Albums which obviously they would have
 20 had they truly believed that they were co-owners. Lastly, notably, neither Vargas nor
 21 Torres ever filed an action for declaratory judgment or otherwise against Chavez or
 22 Yellowcake claiming to be a co-owner of the Albums even though they were released
 23 between 2013 and 2015. Simply put, there is not a shred of credible objective evidence
 24 to prove that either Vargas or Torres were ever co-authors of the Albums.

25 Based on the foregoing, Hyphy's request for summary judgment on
 26 Yellowcake's copyright infringement claims must be denied.

27
 28 ³ It should be noted Vargas and Torres admitted their depositions occurred in Hyphy's conference room. *See* Vargas Trans., [Dkt. 82-11](#) at Pg. 55, Lns. 14-17, Torres Trans., [Dkt. 82-12](#) at Pg. 58, Lns. 10-19.

1 **B. Hyphy Did Not Acquire an Irrevocable Non-Exclusive License to**
 2 **Exploit the Albums**

3 Hyphy also asserts it held “at a minimum, an oral and irrevocable non-exclusive
 4 license from the very outset of the parties’ Agreement and at all relevant times thereafter
 5 to exploit the Albums.” Hyphy Motion, [Dkt. 78](#) at Pg. 12, Lns. 1-9.

6 Hyphy fails to establish entitlement to summary judgment on this prong of its
 7 Motion for several reasons. First, Hyphy’s judicial admissions bar it from arguing the
 8 existence of an oral agreement with Vargas and Torres. Second, Chavez disputes the
 9 existence of the alleged oral agreement. *See* Chavez Decl. [Dkt. 46-2](#), ¶ 14. Third, the
 10 “facts” proffered by Hyphy to establish the alleged “oral and irrevocable non-exclusive
 11 license” (*see* Hyphy SUF, [Dkt. 78-20](#) at ¶¶ 25-28) are patently inadequate to establish
 12 a contract was formed in the first instance or the terms thereof, in particular, that the
 13 supposed oral license would be “irrevocable.” Finally, nothing in [Effects Assoc., Inc.](#)
 14 [v. Cohen](#), 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990), cited by Hyphy, supports its claim that an
 15 implied license is irrevocable or would insulate Hyphy from a claim by Yellowcake.
 16 This is because any such a license would only insulate Hyphy from being sued by
 17 Chavez, Vargas, and Torres as a result of Hyphy’s prior distribution of the Albums. *Id.*
 18 However, it would not insulate Hyphy for its acts of copyright infringement that
 19 occurred after the ownership of the copyrights were sold to Yellowcake.

20 At best, Hyphy would arguably have a breach of contract and indemnification
 21 claim against Chavez, Vargas, and Torres but not a defense against a copyright
 22 infringement claim by Yellowcake as the lawful owner of the copyrights in the Albums
 23 which were infringed by Hyphy’s exploitation of the Albums after they were sold to
 24 Yellowcake.

25 Based on the foregoing, Defendants fail to demonstrate the absence of a genuine
 26 issue of material fact as to the existence of an “oral and irrevocable non-exclusive
 27 license” entitling Hyphy to exploit the Albums and, therefore, this prong of the Hyphy
 28 Motion must be rejected.

VII. **HYPHY FAILS TO SHOW ITS INFRINGEMENT DID NOT DAMAGE YELLOWCAKE**

This prong of Hyphy’s Motion attacks the damages element of Yellowcake’s copyright infringement claim, and proffers three reasons why the Court should award Hyphy summary judgment on damages. *See* Hyphy Motion, [Dkt. 78](#) at Pg. 12, Ln. 13 – Pg. 15, Ln. 2. All three should be rejected.

First, Hyphy argues that Yellowcake did not identify or quantify damages in its Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures and, therefore, pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) Yellowcake cannot present proof of actual damages at trial. However, this rule is inapplicable where the party’s failure to disclose the required information is substantially justified or harmless. Both substantial justification and harmlessness are manifest in this case because all information to measure Yellowcake’s damages has been in the possession of Hyphy and within its knowledge since the beginning of the case. *See Unicon Fin. Services, Inc. v. InterCept, Inc.*, CV-0407965, 2006 WL 8431500, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2006), *affd sub nom. Unicon Fin. Services, Inc. v. InterCept, Inc.*, 256 Fed. Appx. 27 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The court concludes that Unicon’s failure to disclose its damages computation did not prejudice InterCept, since InterCept has, since the beginning of the litigation, been in possession of records that would have permitted it to conduct the calculation itself.”); *Undiscovered Corp. v. Heist Studios*, CV-18-5719, 2019 WL 8219489, at *4 (C.D. Cal Oct. 1, 2019) (holding party is not expected to provide damages calculation which depends on information with the possession of another party).

The failure is also harmless because Yellowcake may establish its 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) damages by establishing the gross revenue that Hyphy derived from its infringing acts. In this case, Hyphy has provided this evidence in its very own interrogatory responses. In its interrogatories, Plaintiff asked Hyphy to identify “the gross amount of revenue generated” from its exploitation of the Albums, and Hyphy responded by admitting it received the following gross amounts for the exploitation of each Album:

(i) “*El Campesino*,” –\$20,000; (ii) “*Des de la Cantina de Mi Barrio (En Vivo)*,” –\$20,000; (iii) “*Nuestra Historia en Vivo*,” –\$20,000; (iv) “*Corridos de Poca M*,” –\$20,000; (v) “*Amigos y Contrarios*” –\$20,000; and (vi) “*Naci Con Suerte de Rey (Mariachi)*” –\$20,000. See [Dkt. 82-6](#), Response 2(vii) and 4(iii). Not surprisingly, Hyphy’s motion does not reference this evidence and its existence is more than sufficient to defeat this prong of its Motion. Moreover, it is apparent that Hyphy will not be prejudiced in preparing for trial, or that any delay will result from the untimeliness of Yellowcake’s identification of documents supporting its damages, because Yellowcake’s actual damages are measured by gross dollar figures which Hyphy itself has already prepared, calculated, and disclosed to Yellowcake.

Even if the Court determines that Yellowcake’s alleged failure to identify Hyphy’s own documents to establish the damages was not substantially justified or harmless, that does not end the inquiry. The Court is required to consider whether the claimed noncompliance involved willfulness, fault, or bad faith . . . and also to consider the availability of lesser sanctions” *R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania*, 673 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2012). We respectfully submit that there is no evidence of willfulness, fault, or bad faith here.

The cases cited by Hyphy in support of its point are inappropriate. *Ingenco Holdings, LLC v. Ace Am. Ins. Co.*, 921 F.3d 803, 821 (9th Cir. 2019) was a complex insurance coverage case involving damages to components of a gas purification plant that eventually shut down. The plaintiffs, the operators of the plant, did not merely fail to provide initial disclosures, they, inter alia, failed to respond to interrogatories requesting damages information or produce damages information until one day before the discovery cut-off date under circumstances found by the district court to involve “willfulness, fault or bad faith.” *Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Services, Inc.*, 541 F.3d 1175, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2008), as amended (Sept. 16, 2008), involved a 66-plaintiff class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act where “at no time prior to trial did [the two lead plaintiffs] disclose damage calculations either for each individual Opt-In

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Plaintiff other than themselves or for the group as a whole.” Respectfully, these cases are not even remotely analogous. They involve extreme factual scenarios with complex damages calculations that were either disclosed “at the eleventh hour” or not at all. Those circumstances are a far cry from those present here.

Second, Hyphy asserts that Yellowcake is not entitled to any actual damages for infringement because Yellowcake has not disclosed any proof of its actual damages to date. Actual damages, according to Hyphy, are assessed by the extent of injury to the copyrighted work’s market value. However, “market value” is not the only measurement of actual damages. 17 U.S.C. 504(b) provides, in relevant part, that: “The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue...” Accordingly, as a matter of law, Yellowcake may establish its 17 U.S.C. 504(b) damages by establishing Hyphy’s gross revenue derived from its infringing acts. As noted above, Hyphy itself provided this information.

Third, Hyphy claims that, under 17 U.S.C. 412(2), Yellowcake cannot recover statutory damages for Hyphy’s acts of infringement. This prong of the Hyphy Motion is moot inasmuch as Yellowcake has elected to seek actual damages as opposed to statutory damages as noted in Yellowcake’s motion for summary judgment.

VIII. HYPHY HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH *PRIMA FACIE* ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS CLAIM RELATED TO THE ARTWORK.

In Section VI.A. of the Hyphy Motion, Hyphy proclaims its “smoking gun” evidence requires the grant of summary judgment on its own infringement claim. Such evidence, however, is not admissible and it is not credible. Moreover, neither Yellowcake nor Colonize ever used this artwork, and Hyphy failed to provide any admissible or credible proof to the contrary or that it suffered any damages. *See Berger*

Decl., [Dkt. 82-14](#) at ¶ 26; Hernandez Decl., [Dkt. 82-16](#) ¶ 11.

Further and almost unbelievably, Yellowcake and Colonize came to discover that Hyphy, in collusion with Morena, a defendant in another action *Yellowcake, Inc. v. Morena Music, Inc., et al.*, Case No. 1:0-cv-787-JLT-BAM, who has colluded with Hyphy and is represented by the same counsel, have committed a fraud on the Court. Specifically, Yellowcake discovered that in fact it was Hyphy and Morena who were the parties who uploaded the alleged infringing uses of Hyphy's artwork to the online record store even though it is Hyphy who is trying to blame Yellowcake for doing so. *See*, Hernandez Decl., [Dkt. 82-16](#) at ¶¶ 11-19.

It is Hyphy's obligation to submit proof that Yellowcake and Colonize actually infringed one of Hyphy's rights under [§ 106 of the Copyright Act](#) and to prove damages. However, during the course of discovery, Hyphy never produced any legitimate evidence that either Yellowcake or Colonize had used any of Hyphy's copyrighted album cover artwork. The only alleged evidence of infringement produced by Hyphy was screenshots of Hyphy's alleged album covers on an online record store named Daddy Kool Records. *See* [Dkt. 55-3](#).

However, as set forth in the Berger and Hernandez Declarations, Yellowcake created its own artwork for the Albums after their acquisition, and neither Yellowcake nor Colonize ever sold or distributed any of the Albums through Daddy Kool Records. In fact, Daddy Kool Records was never a distribution customer of either Yellowcake or Colonize, and neither entity distributed any titles, let alone the Albums with Hyphy's artwork. *See* Berger Decl. [Dkt. 82-14](#), ¶¶ 25-33; Hernandez Decl. [Dkt. 82-16](#), ¶¶ 11-19.

Furthermore, the "evidence" relied on by Hyphy, which are screenshots of the Daddy Kool Records store, produced by Hyphy *do not reference either Yellowcake or Colonize anywhere on the documents*. Tellingly, Hyphy failed to authenticate any of the screenshots. There is no evidence in the record as to who actually uploaded the album artwork or sound recordings to the Daddy Kool Records website. The documents

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1 were not produced pursuant to a valid subpoena or accompanied by a business records
 2 certification from Daddy Kool Records. Since there is no foundation to identify who
 3 created these documents or when they were created, they are unavailing to Hyphy's
 4 motion. See *Canada v. Blain's Helicopters, Inc.*, 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987)
 5 ("This court has consistently held that documents which have not had a proper
 6 foundation laid to authenticate them cannot support a motion for summary judgment.").

7 Most disturbingly, by submitting these documents as alleged proof of
 8 Yellowcake and Colonize's infringement of Hyphy's artwork, both Hyphy and Morena
 9 have essentially committed a fraud on this Court. Specifically, when Hyphy first
 10 disclosed these screenshots and alleged that it was Yellowcake who uploaded the
 11 artwork to Daddy Kool Records online store, Yellowcake and Colonize decided to
 12 investigate these claims as they had no knowledge of or business dealings with Daddy
 13 Kool Records. Yellowcake and Colonize were able to track down the digital distributor
 14 who distributes to Daddy Kool Records and discovered that it was Morena Music, Inc.
 15 d/b/a Long Play Music who allegedly uploaded Hyphy's album covers and sound
 16 recordings to Daddy Kool Records' website, not Yellowcake or Colonize. See the
 17 Hernandez Declaration Dkt. 82-16, at ¶¶ 15-17 and Exh. "A" to the Hernandez
 18 Declaration.

19 As such, Hyphy and Morena knowingly uploaded the album artwork and sound
 20 recordings to Daddy Kool Records and then attempted to blame Yellowcake and
 21 Colonize for it. This is further supported by the fact that Hyphy did not produce these
 22 documents until after the initial close of discovery and on the verge of the prior deadline
 23 for filing summary judgment because they knew they had no evidence to support their
 24 claims of copyright infringement against Yellowcake or Colonize. See Hyphy's *Ex*
 25 *Parte* Application for Leave to Supplement Initial Disclosures and Responses to
 26 Request for Production of Documents Dkt. 55.

27 Furthermore, these screenshots also actually strengthen Yellowcake's claim of
 28 ownership of the sound recordings of these albums because under where it says "label"

1 it is followed by the letters “JC” which stands for Jesus Chavez, which means that
 2 Hyphy acknowledged that Jesus Chavez was the owner of the albums at the time they
 3 were being distributed by Hyphy and not owned by Hyphy. *See Hyphy’s Ex Parte*
 4 *Application for Leave to Supplement Initial Disclosures and Responses to Request for*
 5 *Production of Documents* [Dkt. 55-3](#).

6 Lastly, even if Yellowcake and Colonize did use Hyphy’s album artwork, which
 7 they did not, Hyphy has failed to produce any admissible evidence to substantiate that
 8 they suffered any monetary damages as a result and statutory damages are not claimed
 9 or available since copyright registrations for the artwork were filed after the alleged acts
 10 of infringement. As such, Yellowcake and Colonize are entitled to Summary Judgment
 11 in their favor on Hyphy’s Second Counterclaim for copyright infringement.

12 CONCLUSION

13 For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court: (i)
 14 deny Hyphy’s Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 in its
 15 entirety; and (ii) grant Yellowcake such other and further relief as the court may deem
 16 just, proper and equitable.

17 Dated: August 4, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

ABRAMS FENSTERMAN, LLP

By: /s/ Seth L. Berman

Seth L. Berman, Esq. (*admitted pro hac vice*)

***Attorneys for Plaintiff Yellowcake, Inc., and
 Counterdefendants Yellowcake, Inc., Colonize
 Media, Inc., and Jose David Hernandez***

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this document filed through the ECF system on this ____ day of August 2023, will be sent electronically to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) and paper copies will be sent to those that are indicated as non-registered participants, if any.

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